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INTRODUCTION
Analysing the relationship between the executive and the courts is
particularly interesting to an English lawyer when it takes place at a
conference devoted to constitutional law. In the UK, we of course have
no written constitution, and the term "unconstitutional" has no defined
legal content. As a Canadian writer put it, for the American, anything
unconstitutional is illegal, however it may seem: for the British,
anything unconstitutional is wrong, however legal it may be.1
As a result, the relationship between the executive and the courts in
English law is not regulated by any formal constitutional framework, but
* Associate Fellow, Centre for Public Law, University of Cambridge, 4-5 Grays
Inn Square, London WC1R 5AH.
1. See A. BRADLEY AND K. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27
(12th ed. 1997) (citing JR. MALLORY, THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT
(1984)).
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has evolved as a result of history and convention. The enactment of the
Human Rights Act (the HRA) in 1998 therefore resulted in a significant
constitutional shift-by enacting the European Convention of Human
Rights into English law, the courts have acquired a wider supervisory
jurisdiction over executive decision making, which it is vital to consider.
In this paper I propose to focus on two principal issues:
" the extent. to which executive decisions is regulated by law;
and
* the degree to which the Court scrutinises executive decision
making when reviewing the merits of particular decisions.
THE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING
Differentiating the source of power a public body is potentially
exercising is important when considering the extent to which the Courts
regulate executive decisions.
The paradigm case of public law decision-making in England is that
created by statute. Obviously, both central and local government
decision makers have statutory powers and duties, and these decisions
will invariably be subject to review. In particular, local authorities are
statutory bodies and therefore cannot make any decisions that are outside
the scope of those statutory powers.
The Ultra Vires Principle and Local Government
Any decision of a local authority which is not based on a statutory
power is ultra vires because it has acted without jurisdiction to do so.
The concept of ultra vires is said to be based on parliamentary intent, but
whilst the concept plainly applies to public law challenges based on the
absence of statutory authority, the principle of ultra vires provides no
explanation for complaints about the exercise of common law powers,
like the use of the royal prerogative.2 Where a decision is ultra vires, the
Court must establish its invalidity. Where the Court grants a remedy,
however, it will normally treat the unlawful act as being null and void so
that the decision in question is retrospectively held to be invalid.
The ultra vires doctrine has created a number of difficulties for
local authorities where the courts have decided that the authority had no
legal power to make the decision in question. Thus, in Hazell v.
Hammersmith the House of Lords decided there was no express statutory
power entitling the council to enter into highly speculative loan swapping
2. For a valuable discussion of these issues, see JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
CONSTITUTION (Christopher Forsyth ed., Hart Publishing, 2000).
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financial transactions although it had an implied power under section 111
of the Local Government Act 1972 to do anything which was ancillary to
the discharge of any of its functions.3 Nevertheless, the House of Lords
decided that it was not the function of the authority to enter into loan
swaps.4 In R. v. Richmond L.B.C. Ex parte McCarthy & Stone the House
of Lords decided that no charge could be made for pre-application advice
in relation to a planning application; giving pre-application advice was
not itself a function of the local planning authority within the meaning of
section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 and to charge for such
advice did not facilitate, nor was it conducive or incidental to, the
authority's functions of considering and determining planning
applications.5
These well known limitations were intended to be overcome when
the Government decided in 2000 to enact a general power allowing a
local authority to promote or improve social, economic or environmental
well-being.6  However, the Court of Appeal in Brent LBC v. Risk
Management decided that a decision by local authorities to save money
by entering into a mutual insurance company was not undertaken to
achieve the purpose of promoting welfare; nor was it incidental or
conducive to a local authority function.'
The ultra vires doctrine therefore continues to impose significant
restrictions on local government decision-making.
The Decision-Making Powers of Central Government
Central government exercises statutory powers, powers which
derive from the Crown's prerogative and other common law powers.
The need for central government to exercise non-statutory powers means
that there are some areas of decision making that are not subject to any
form of legal control.
The Crown's Prerogative Powers
In addition to its statutory powers the Crown retains a discretionary
power at common law known as the Crown prerogative. In the landmark
decision in 1984 in the GCHQ case the House of Lords decided that
3. See Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, [1992] 2 A.C.
1 (H.L.).
4. See id.
5. See R v. Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council, ex parte McCarthy
& Stone, [1992] 2 A.C. 48 (H.L.).
6. See Local Government Act, 2000, c. 22, § 2 (Eng.).
7. See Brent London Borough Council v. Risk Management Partners Ltd., [2009]
E.W.C.A. Civ 490.
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powers derived from the royal prerogative were subject to judicial review
provided they were justiciable.8 In that case the House of Lords took the
view that it could subject a decision to de-recognise trade unions at a
Government communications centre which intercepts phone calls
without having gone through a process of consultation despite it having
created a legitimate expectation that it would do so. The courts have
subsequently decided that a number of prerogative powers such as:
* the residual prerogative power of the Home Secretary in the
immigration field;9
* the power to make ex gratia payments to victims of
miscarriages of justice;' °
* the power to intercept telephone calls; 1 and
* the power to grant a pardon.
12
However, prerogative powers which relate to the defence of the
realm or foreign policy or relations are not justiciable and within the
scope of judicial review. Consequently, the Divisional Court held that it
would not consider whether the Iraq War was a breach of international
law or a breach of UN Resolution 144,13 and the Court of Appeal took
the view that it would not review the merits of possessing nuclear
weapons in order to decide whether their decommission was unlawful.'
4
But the traditional approach the courts have taken towards
justiciability of the royal prerogative is open to question on at least two
grounds. First, the English courts have been obliged to consider these
issues in other contexts and have not been deflected by any question
concerning justiciability. Thus, in the Human Rights Act case
concerning the legality of the Iraq War the House of Lords would have
ruled on this issue, had the human rights claim itself been well founded.' 5
Secondly, so far as any question of expertise arises, the English courts
are increasingly familiar with the idea of construing international
conventions.
8. See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of the Civil Service, [1985] A.C.
374 (H.L.).
9. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Beedassee, [ 1989]
C.O.D. 525.
10. See R. (Christofides) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] 1
W.L.R. 2769 (Q.B.).
11. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Ruddock and
Others, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1482 (Q.B.).
12. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Bentley, [1994]
Q.B. 349; Lewis v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [2001] 2 A.C. 50.
13. See R. (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister, [2002]
E.W.H.C. 2777 (Admin)
14. See R. (Machiori) v. Environment Agency, [2002] Eu.L.R. 225.
15. See R. (Gentle) v. Prime Minister, [2008] 1 A.C. 1356 (H.L.).
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The Crown's Additional Common Law Powers
The courts have also recognised that the Crown has common law
powers to do acts which do not infringe the rights of others and are not
prohibited by law such as:
* the power to make ex gratia payments,'
6
* the power to maintain a list of individuals considered to be
unsuitable to work with children in the absence of an express
statutory power.
1 7
The basis for these powers is said to be that the Crown as a legal
personality has the same capacity as a natural person and therefore can
do anything a natural person can do, although the rationale is not
convincing.'8
In R. (Shrewsbury & Atcham BC and Congleton BC) v. the
Secretary of State for Communities, the Court of Appeal accepted that
the Crown had a common law power to taking preparatory steps to
introduce anticipated legislation, such as inviting and consulting on
proposals to change local government structures, because it was bound
by previous Court of Appeal decisions.' 9 In that case, however, there
was an important division of the Court of Appeal about the powers of the
Court to intervene. Lord Justice Camwath thought that:
[A]s a matter of capacity, no doubt, [the Crown] has power to do
whatever a private person can do. But as an organ of government, it
can only exercise those powers for the public benefit and for
identifiably "governmental" purposes within limits set by the law.
20
By contrast Richards LJ took the view that it was:
[U]nnecessary and unwise to introduce qualifications along the lines
of those suggested by Carnwath LJ ... to the effect that [such
powers] can only be exercised "for the public benefit" or for
"identifiably 'governmental' purposes." It seems to me that any such
limiting principle would have to be so wide as to be of no practical
utility or would risk imposing an artificial and inappropriate
restriction upon the work of government.
21
16. See R. (Hooper) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2005] 1 WLR
1681.
17. See R. v. Secretary of Health ex parte C, [2000] 1 FCR 471.
18. See John Howell QC, What the Crown May Do, Delivered at the Constitutional
and Administrative Law Bar Association Summer Conference (July 24-26, 2009).
19. See R. (on the Application of Shrewsbury & Atcham BC and another) v.
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Waller U said:
The question is thus whether there should be an ability to challenge
as unlawful an action taken "not for the public benefit" or which has
not been taken for identifiably governmental purposes.
22
It is respectfully submitted that as a matter of principle, the analysis
of Camwath U is to be preferred. The view of Richards U in substance
involves a claim (a) that it is for the executive, not Parliament to decide,
in what new activities the government may engage, in what
circumstances and under what conditions and (b) that ministers have an
unfettered discretion in relation to what they thus do, provided that in
each case they do not do anything unlawful or which they are prohibited
from doing. This claim creates scope for the abuse of public power that
the courts have rejected in line with the development of modem public
law. By leaving unlimited the purposes for which ministers may act and
thus also the considerations which they may take into account, it allows
public powers to be exercised other than in the public interest and other
than for public purposes.
The Impact of the Human Rights Act
Before turning to the question of how the Human Rights Act (HRA)
affects the legal regulation of executive decision making, it is important
to say something about the nature of the HRA itself. The HRA was
enacted in 1998 to give effect to the European Convention of Human
Rights.
It has been widely recognised that the HRA is a statute of
constitutional significance because the Convention is effectively our Bill
of Rights: see, for example, the dicta in Brown v. Stott2 3 of Lord
Bingham2 4 and Lord Steyn 25 and those of Lord Woolf CJ in R v. Offen.
26
Similarly, in McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers27 Lord
Steyn said that the HRA was a constitutional measure designed to
buttress freedom of expression, fulfilling the function of a Bill of Rights
in our legal system.28  In R. (Laporte) v. Chief Constable of
22. Id. 80.
23. Brown v. Stott, [2003] 1 A.C. 681.
24. See id. at 703.
25. See id. at 708.
26. See R. v. Offen, [2001] 1 WLR 253, 275.
27. See McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 277,
297.
28. See generally Jeffry Jowell, Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional
Judicial Review, [2000] Pub.L. 671; G. Huscroft, Rights, Bills of Rights and the Role of
Courts and Legislatures, in LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVEs FROM DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (G. Huscroft and P. Rishworth eds. 2002).
[Vol. 28:3
THE EXECUTIVE AND THE COURTS
Gloucestershire Constabulary Lord Bingham described the HRA in
giving effect to Articles 10 and 11 as representing a "constitutional
shift., 29 Furthermore, section 3 of the HRA, in effect, permits judicial
review of Acts of Parliament; its far-reaching character (exemplified by
Ghaidan v. Godin- Mendoza)30 represents a radical change to the
conventional view of parliamentary sovereignty as traditionally
understood. 31 As Lord Bingham emphasized in the Belmarsh detainee
case, the courts have been given a wholly democratic mandate by
Parliament under HRA to delineate the boundaries of a rights based
democracy.32
The enactment of the HRA has resulted in a sea change in English
law; where a public authority interferes with qualified rights like the
right of respect for private life or freedom of expression, the public body
must justify that interference by showing that the interference is
"prescribed by law" and "proportionate."
The obligation of being "prescribed by law" under the Convention
therefore reverses the approach of Megarry J in Malone v. Commissioner
of Police for the Metropolis when he held that public authorities are
permitted to do anything which is not unlawful.3 3 The principle that
underlies the idea of being "prescribed by law" or "in accordance with
the law" is that restrictions on rights must comply with the rule of law by
satisfying the requirement of legal certainty.34
The concept of "prescribed by law" does not, however, merely refer
back to domestic law; it refers to the quality of the law, requiring it to be
compatible with the rule of law, a principle that is expressly mentioned
in the preamble to the Convention.35
29. See R. (on the Application of Laporte) v. Chief Constable of Gloucestershire
Constabulary, [2007] 2 A.C. 105, 34 (H.L.).
30. See Ghaidan v. Godin- Mendoza, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (H.L.).
31. See Pickin v. British Railway, [1974] A.C. 765, 782G (H.L.) (Statement of Lord
Reid).
32. See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 42.
33. See Malone v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, [1979] Ch. D. 344;
Cf R. v. Somerset County Council, exparte Fewings, [1995] 1 All ER 513 (observing
that approach taken by Laws J. where he observed that rule of law that applied to private
and public persons were wholly different). Whereas a private person can do whatever he
likes unless the law prohibits it, a public body has no rights, and any action it takes must
be justified by positive law. See id. The principles which apply to statutory bodies do not
affect the Crown, which (like a private individual) is free to do whatever it chooses unless
this is expressly prohibited. See id.; see also R. v. Secretary of State for Health exparte
C., [2000] 1 F.L.R. 627.
34. See de Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries,
Lands and Housing, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 675, 681 (Lord Clyde).
35. See Malone v. U.K., App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 67 (1984); Silver
v. U.K., App. No. 5947/72, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 90 (1983); Golder v. U.K., App. No.
4451/70, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, 34 (1975).
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In a trilogy of cases, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,36 Silver v.
United Kingdom37 and Malone v. United Kingdom,38 the Court has ruled
that the phrase "prescribed by law" and/or "in accordance with the law"
creates three requirements:
* the interference in question must have some basis in
domestic law;
* the law must be adequately accessible; and
• the law must be formulated so that it is sufficiently
foreseeable.
It is instructive to compare two decisions of the House of Lords in
considering the impact of the prescribed by law principle. In R. (Gillan)
v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis39 it was argued that the
powers to authorise and confirm stop and search powers under the
Terrorism Act 2000 for the whole of the Metropolitan District were not
"accessible": so that a member of the public might know that the police
had the stop and search power, but not know that, for example in
Battersea, that he might be liable to be stopped or that the police were
authorised to stop and search him. However, Lord Bingham doubted
whether the authorisation and confirmation process should be regarded
as "law" rather than a procedure for bringing the law into potential effect
and pointed out that it would stultify public protection if authorisation or
confirmation were publicised prospectively.40 Lord Hope stressed that
the sufficiency of the measures had to be viewed against the nature and
degree of the interference with Convention rights and took the view that
the intrusion under the stop and search powers was not very great.4'
Lord Brown rejected the criticism that the power would be used so
arbitrarily as to be inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty.42
The context in which the challenges were made obviously heavily
conditioned the approach taken by the House of Lords. Nevertheless, it
is respectfully submitted that the analysis of the House of Lords is open
to question. Those doubts were confirmed when the case recently came
before the European Court of Human Rights where the European Court
rejected the House of Lords' approach and decided that the powers the
36. Sunday Times v. U.K., App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271 (1980).
37. Silver v. U.K., 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 347 (1983).
38. Malone v. U.K, 7 Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 14 (1984).
39. R (Gillan) v. Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis, [2006] U.K.H.L. 12; [2006] 2
W.L.R. 537 (Eng.).
40. See id. f35.
41. See id. 56.
42. See id. ff 76-77.
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police exercised were not sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to
adequate legal safeguards against abuse.43
The House of Lords also took a more rigorous line, however, in the
very recent case of R. (Purdy) v. DPP.4 4 In a case decided on 30 July
2009, the House had to consider the liability of a husband to be
prosecuted for assisting suicide of his wife who is an MS sufferer when
her condition became unbearable. The Code for Crown Prosecutors
would normally provide sufficient guidance to Crown Prosecutors and to
the public as to how decisions should or were likely to be taken as to
whether, in a given case, it would be in the public interest to prosecute.
However, that could not be said of cases where the offence was aiding or
abetting the suicide of a person who was terminally ill or severely and
incurably disabled, who wished to be helped to travel to a country where
assisted suicide was lawful and who, having the capacity to take such a
decision, did so freely and with full understanding of the consequences.
The Code was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of accessibility and
foreseeability in assessing how prosecutorial discretion was likely to be
exercised. That difficulty was underlined by the decision letter in
another similar case in which the DPP, when considering the discretion
under section 2(4), had found that many of the factors listed in the Code
were irrelevant and that other unlisted factors had to be considered in
such difficult cases. The DPP was required to promulgate an offence-
specific policy, identifying the facts and circumstances that he would
take into account in deciding whether to consent to a prosecution.
These two House of Lords decisions serve to demonstrate that
context in which a case must be decided is often decisive. This is a topic
to which I shall return later.
However, I should now consider my second area of discussion, the
English approach to challenging executive decisions where the complaint
is about the underlying merits of the decision in question.
CHALLENGING THE MERITS OF EXECUTIVE DECISIONS ON JUDICIAL
REVIEW GROUNDS
Introduction
In order to work out the proper approach to a merits challenge in an
administrative law case, it is necessary to identify a governing principle,
and in England we take the view that the principle of separation of
43. Gillan v United Kingdom, App. No. 4158/05, 76-87 (2010), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/search.asp?sessionid=48950829&skin=hudoc-en (enter
4158/05 in the Application Number field) (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
44. R. (Purdy) v. DPP, [2009] U.K.H.L. 45, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403 (Eng.).
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powers justifies the courts taking a stand off approach to executive
decision making. This highly deferential approach closely resembles the
rationality standard applied by the American courts and is known in
English law as the Wednesbury test.
45
However, the principle of separation of powers is not itself well
developed in English law. It has been overshadowed in English law by
the more dominant constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty
and the rule of law. Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the
Lord Chancellor both was a Cabinet minister and could sit in the House
of Lords. And the highest court in the UK has been a committee of the
upper legislative house until October 2009 when the Supreme Court
came into operation.
In any event, the principle of separation of powers has little
application to executive decision-making (as opposed to legislative
policy choices). The rationale for judicial deference towards decisions of
the executive is based on the principle of separation of powers,46 that it is
not the task of the judiciary to usurp the function of the executive by
substituting its decisions for the authority charged by law to decide the
matters in question.47 However, the constitutional status of executive
decision-making can be overstated.
First, it is not self evident that administrative decisions should be
accorded primary weight by the judiciary, simply by virtue of the fact that
they fall within the executive's province where they clash with other
principles we value and where the court can exercise a supervisory role.
The fact that the court will acknowledge that the executive has special
expertise which makes it better equipped to decide certain questions of fact
45. See Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223.
46. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, I THE SPIRT OF LAWS 150-52 (Thomas
Nugent trans., The Colonial Press 1900):
Political liberty is to be found only... when there is no abuse of power. But
constant experience shows us that every man is invested with power is apt to
abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go....
To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power
should be a check to power ...
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person...
there can be no liberty....
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislature and executive....
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers....
Id.
47. See Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans, [1982] 3 All E.R. 141, [1982]
1 W.L.R. 1155, 1160 (Eng.) (Lord Halsham); see generally Lord Irvine, Judges and
Decision-Makers: the Theory and Practice ofWednesbury Review [1996] Pub. L. 59.
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(such as whether there is a genuine threat to national security) does not
mean it should concede to the executive's views on the crunch
constitutional question: whether, for example, the limitations on freedom
of expression accord with the democratic requirements of constitutional
review.48  In other words, it is valuable to draw on Jeffrey Jowell's
important distinction in this context between constitutional competence and
institutional competence. Secondly, routine decision-making by civil
servants or local government officers has no direct connection with voters
making choices through the ballot box. Thirdly, where the lawfulness of an
administrative decision is being assessed, the court is not being called upon
to evaluate the underlying policy and its objectives, and it is difficult to
understand why the judicial assessment of an executive decision is
inherently less valid or legitimate than that initially made by a civil servant.
Finally, the separation of powers is not the cornerstone of the English
constitution, at least by comparison with the subtly structured institutional
framework in the United States.
The Wednesbury Rationality Test
When applying the Wednesbury test the court is always involved in
a "review" exercise: it has to make a secondary judgment about the
reasonableness of the decision-maker's primary judgment. The
appropriate test of reasonableness is the very stringent one of posing the
question, "is the decision so absurd that no sensible person could ever
dream it lay within the powers of the decision-maker"49; "is the decision
so wrong that no reasonable person could sensibly take that view" 50; or
"is the decision so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it."
51
When considering whether a decision maker has acted irrationality,
however, the courts use a sliding scale of intensity of review ranging
from super Wednesbury managerial decisions where there is a high
degree of deference to the decision-maker (such as decisions involving
the allocation of resources or policy) 52 to cases involving human rights:
48. See Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional
Capacity?, [2003] Pub.L. 592 [hereinafter Jowell, Judicial Deference].
49. See Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223,
764.
50" See Sec'y of State for Educ. & Sci. v. Tameside Metro. Borough Council, [1977]
A.C. 1014, 1026 (H.L.) (Lord Denning).
51. See Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] A.C.
374, 410 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock).
52. See R. v. Sec'y of State for the Envt., ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council
[1986] A.C. 240 (H.L.); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Envt., ex parte Hammersmith and
Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 A.C. 521. (H.L.).
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where (as the Court of Appeal emphasised in R. v. Ministry of Defence,
exp. Smith) 53 the more substantial the interference with human rights, the
more the court will require by way of justification before it is satisfied
that the decision is reasonable.
Nevertheless, there are obvious and real problems for the
practitioner on the coal face about applying such a strict rationality
principle. The threshold test is so high that it seldom has practical utility.
In particular, in complex factual cases, the Wednesbury test is just too
crude as a means of supervising executive decision-making.
The limitations of the Wednesbury test were revealed in Smith, a
case regarding gays in the military, where the Court of Appeal accepted
that dismissals of gays from the military did not amount to Wednesbury
reasonableness.54 Sir Thomas Bingham MR observed that to dismiss a
person from his or her employment on the grounds of a private sexual
preference and to interrogate him or her about private sexual behaviour
would not appear to show respect for that person's private and family life
and that there might be room for argument as to whether the policy
answered a "pressing social need" and, in particular, was proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued. However, he held that these were not
questions to which answers could be properly or usefully proffered by
the Court of Appeal, but rather were questions for the European Court of
Human Rights to consider in relation to a complaint that the right to
respect for privacy had been breached.
Subsequently, the European Court decided in emphatic terms that
the UK had breached the right of respect to private life." As Lord Steyn
stressed in his seminal opinion in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex p. Daly56 even the heightened scrutiny Wednesbury test
developed by the Court of Appeal in Smith is not necessarily appropriate
to the protection of human rights.57 And Lord Cooke, the former
President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, observed in Daly:
I think that the day will come when it will be more widely recognised
that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn.
was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative
law, in so far as it suggested that there are degrees of
unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an
administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial
53. R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1996] 1 Q.B. 517.
54. See id.
55. See Smith & Grady v. U.K., App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 29 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 493 (1999).
56. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Daly, [2001] UKHL 26, [2001]
2 A.C. 532 (U.K.).
57. See Smith & Grady v. U.K., 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493.
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invalidation. The depth of judicial review and the deference due to
administrative discretion vary with the subject matter. It may well
be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative
field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not
capricious or absurd.
58
The Development of the Proportionality Test
The powerful criticisms of the Wednesbury test has led English
lawyers to argue that a crude rationality test should be replaced by a
structured proportionality test when the Court reviews executive
decisions.
Although the development of a proportionality test in administrative
law was predicted by Lord Diplock in the GCHQ case in 1984, that day
has not yet arrived.59  In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Brind,6° the House of Lords rejected the idea that
proportionality should be a ground for judicial review. 61 After a period
of considerable debate,62 Lord Slynn remarked in R. (Alconbury
Developments Ltd.) v. Environmental Secretary63 that the time had come
to recognise proportionality as part of administrative law.
64
Nevertheless, in R. (British Civilian Internees (Far East Region) v.
Secretary for Defence the Court of Appeal held that proportionality had
58. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Daly [2001] UKHL 26, [2001]
2 A.C. 532 at 549.
59. See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of the Civil Service, [1985] A.C.
374 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock).
60. See R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. 696,
696 (H.L.).
61. See id. Although Lords Bridge, Roskill and Templeman left open its possible
recognition as an independent ground of judicial review. See id. at 749-51. Compare
Neill LJ in R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte NALGO, [1992] 5
Admin. L.R. 785, 800-01 (Wales) (taking view that House of Lords rejected doctrine of
proportionality in Brind), with Hoffman LJ in R. v. Plymouth City Council, ex parte
Plymouth and South Devon Cooperative Society, [1993] P.L.R 75, 88 (holding that status
of principle as instrument of English judicial review was to say least uncertain), and
Sedley J. in R v. Manchester Metropolitan University, ex parte Nolan, [1994] E.L.R 380,
395 (U.K.) (saying proportionality was potentially available today as discrete head of
challenge in appropriate cases).
62. See, e.g., S.A. DE SMITH ET AL., JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
411-421 (5th ed. 1995); Lord Irvine, supra note 47; Jeffrey Jowell, In the Shadow of
Wednesbury, [1997] J.R. 75; Sir John Laws, Wednesbury, in THE GOLDEN METWAND
AND THE CROOKED CORD 185 (Sir William Wade, Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare eds.,
Oxford University Press 1998).
63. See R. (Alconbury Developments) v. Env't Sec'y, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, T 53.
64. See Tucker v. Sec'y of State for Social Sec., [2002] H.L.R 27. See generally,
Mark Elliott, The HRA 1998 and Standard of Substantive Review, [2002] J.R. 97;
Michael Fordham, Common Law Proportionality, [2002] J.R. 110; Richard Clayton,
Proportionality and the HRA 1998: Implications for Substantive Review, [2002] J.R. 124.
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not replaced the Wednesbury test in for administrative law cases which
raise no human rights or European Community law issues.65 Although
the Court of Appeal expressed strong reservations about the justification
for retaining the Wednesbury test, it took the view that it was not their
role to perform the burial rights.
66
Nevertheless, as a result of the HRA the English courts have
developed a structured proportionality test which could be readily
adopted when they review executive decision making. The House of
Lords has held that under the HRA, proportionality requires 67 the Court
to examine four distinct issues:
* whether the objective justifying the interference is
sufficiently important to justify limiting the right;
* whether the measures designed to meet the objective of the
interference are rationally connected to it;
* whether the means used to impair the Convention right are
no more than is necessary to accomplish that objective; and
* whether the interference strikes a fair balance between the
rights of the individual and the interests of the community
which requires carefully assessing the severity and
consequences of the interference.68
In order to make the proportionality test context sensitive, however,
the Courts have adopted a principle of judicial deference. This principle
of judicial deference describes the idea that the courts (out of respect for
the legislature or executive) will decline to make their own independent
judgment on a particular issue. The principle and its rationale have been
highly controversial.69
65. See Ass'n of British Internees v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2003] Q.B. 1397.
66. Id. 34-35.
67. See R. (Clays Lane Housing Coop.) v. Housing Corp. [2005] 1 W.L.R 2229
(noting test of proportionality is different for Article 1 of First Protocol).
68. See R. v. A. (No 2), [2002] 1 A.C. 45; R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
ex parte Daly, [2001] 2 A.C. 532; Huang v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2007] 2
A.C. 167, 19 (emphasizing fourth element); A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
[2005] 2 A.C. 68, 30, (Lord Bingham suggesting that to some extent these issues are, or
may be, interrelated).
69. See, e.g., D. Pannick, Principles of Interpretation of Convention Rights Under
the Human Rights Act and the Discretionary Area of Judgment, [1998] Pub.L. 545;
Richard A. Edwards, Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act, 65 MODERN L.
REV. 859 (2002); Murray Hunt, Sovereignty's Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law
Needs the Concept of 'Due Deference', in PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED
CONSTITUTION 337 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., Hart Publishing 2003);
Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Deference, supra note 48; Richard Clayton, Judicial Deference
and 'Democratic Dialogue': The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention Under the Human
Rights Act 1998, [2004] Pub. L. 33 [hereinafter Clayton, Judicial Deference]; T.
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In R. (Pro-Life) v. BBC,70 Lord Hoffmann took the view that the
word "deference" is inappropriate to describe a decision as to which
branch of government in a particular instance has the decision-making
power and what the limits of that legal power are.7' He stressed that the
allocation by the courts of its decision-making powers to another branch
of government is not a matter of courtesy or deference, but is based on
recognised legal principles such as the principle that the independence of
the courts is necessary for a proper decision of disputed legal rights, or
that the principle that majority approval is necessary for a proper
decision on policy or the allocations of resources.72
Lord Steyn, however, has taken issue with the suggestion that there
is a democratic prohibition preventing the courts from examining certain
issues that they are not competent to adjudicate on national security or
other issues, or that democracy entails that there are zones of immunity
that are not subject to judicial review.
73
When considering the degree of judicial deference that is
appropriate, it is important to differentiate between institutional and
constitutional competence of the courts to decide the relevant question.
Under the HRA there is no need for the courts to defer to Parliament or
the executive on the ground that they are elected and thus responsible to
the people, as Lord Bingham discusses in the Belmarsh case, A. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, discussed earlier.
Additionally, in Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department74 Lord Bingham considered detailed submissions on the
question of judicial deference in the context of whether the interferences
with family life were justified under Article 8(2) of the European
Convention and observed that:
14. Much argument was directed on the hearing of these appeals, and
much authority cited, on the appellate immigration authority's proper
approach to its task, due deference, discretionary areas of judgment,
the margin of appreciation, democratic accountability, relative
Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue: Constitutional Theory and the Human Rights Act
1998, [2005] Pub. L. 306; Richard Clayton, Principles of Deference, [2006] J.R. 109.
70. R. (Pro-Life Alliance) v. BBC, [2003] UKHL 23, [2004] 1 A.C. 185 (H.L.). See
also Lord Hoffman, Separation of Powers, The COMBAR Lecture 2001, 23rd October
2001 [2002] J.R.; Eric Barendt, Free Speech and Abortion, [2003] Pub.L. 580; Jeffrey
Jowell, Judicial Deference, supra note 48.
71. See R. (Pro-Life Alliance) v. BBC, [2003] UKHL 23, [2004] 1 A.C. 185, 75,
76.
72. See id. 76.
73. See Lord Steyn, Deference: A Tangled Story, [2005] Pub. L. 346. See also
Richard Clayton, Judicial Deference, supra note 69.
74. Huang v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 A.C.
167 (U.K.).
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institutional competence, a distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal
between decisions based on policy and decisions not so based, and so
on. We think, with respect, that there has been a tendency, both in
the arguments addressed to the courts and in the judgments of the
courts, to complicate and mystify what is not, in principle, a hard task
to define, however difficult the task is, in practice, to perform....
15. The first task of the appellate immigration authority is to
establish the relevant facts....
16. The authority will wish to consider and weigh all that tells in
favour of the refusal of leave which is challenged, with particular
reference to justification under article 8(2). There will, in almost any
case, be certain general considerations to bear in mind: the general
administrative desirability of applying known rules if a system of
immigration control is to be workable, predictable, consistent and fair
as between one applicant and another; the damage to good
administration and effective control if a system is perceived by
applicants intemationally to be unduly porous, unpredictable or
perfunctory; the need to discourage non-nationals admitted to the
country temporarily from believing that they can commit serious
crimes and yet be allowed to remain; the need to discourage fraud,
deception and deliberate breaches of the law; and so on.... The
giving of weight to factors such as these is not, in our opinion, aptly
described as deference: it is performance of the ordinary judicial task
of weighing up the competing considerations on each side and
according appropriate weight to the judgment of a person with
responsibility for a given subject matter and access to special sources
of knowledge and advice. That is how any rational judicial decision-
maker is likely to proceed.
7 5
Nevertheless, I would respectfully suggest that the approach taken
by the House of Lords is not entirely helpful. To say that it is easy to
recognise the elephant in the room (however difficult it is to describe that
elephant) does not meet the challenge of working out how to apply a
structured proportionality test to very different contexts. This issue is
critical because of the principle of legal certainty, the idea that decision
makers should have some confidence in their ability to predict with
accuracy whether or not a decision is vulnerable to legal challenge. This
problem cannot be answered by the mantra of appealing to a number of
general (but undefined) criteria or asserting that the courts should take a
hard look at the facts. I would argue that the courts need to provide
75. Id. % 14-16.
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much more specific guidance in order to resolve these fundamental
questions.
CONCLUSION
The absence of any constitutional framework inevitably means that
the legal regulation of the executive is patchy in English law. As I have
indicated earlier, there remain areas of executive decision-making that
appear to be immune from legal scrutiny. The legal test for assessing the
merits of executive decision-making has traditionally been extremely
deferential, but the recent case law in England has taken a much more
rigorous approach. The courts now exercise a more active role in
ensuring that the executive is accountable to the legal process.

